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Abstract
Using the linearized DC power flow model, we study cascading failures and their spatial and
temporal properties in the US Western Interconnect (USWI) power grid. We also introduce the
preferential Degree And Distance Attachment (DADA) model, with similar degree distributions,
resistances, and currents to the USWI. We investigate the behavior of both grids resulting from the
failure of a single line. We find that the DADA model and the USWI model react very similarly
to that failure, and that their blackout characteristics resemble each other. In many cases, the
failure of a single line can cause cascading failures, which impact the entire grid. We characterize
the resilience of the grid by three parameters, the most important of which is tolerance α, which
is the ratio of the maximal load a line can carry to its initial load. We characterize a blackout by
its yield, which we define as the ratio of the final to the initial consumed currents. We find that if
α ≥ 2, the probability of a large blackout occurring is very small. By contrast, in a broad range of
1 < α < 2, the initial failure of a single line can result, with a high probability, in cascading failures
leading to a massive blackout with final yield less than 80%. The yield has a bimodal distribution
typical of a first-order transition, i.e., the failure of a randomly selected line leads either to an
insignificant current reduction or to a major blackout. We find that there is a latent period in the
development of major blackouts during which few lines are overloaded, and the yield remains high.
The duration of this latent period is proportional to the tolerance. The existence of the latent
period suggests that intervention during early time steps of a cascade can significantly reduce the
risk of a major blackout.
∗Corresponding author
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I. INTRODUCTION
The failure of a transmission line in a power grid leads to a redistribution of power flows
in the grid. This redistribution may cause overloads of other lines and their subsequent
failures, leading to a major blackout in a large area [6, 10, 24, 30]. These failures may be
initiated by natural disasters, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and solar flares, as well as
by terrorist and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks [33]. Recent blackouts, such as the
2003 and 2012 blackouts in the Northeastern US and in India [28, 29, 32], demonstrate that
major power failure has a devastating impact on many aspects of modern life. Hence, there
is a dire need to study the properties of cascading failures in power grids.
The studies of failures in power grids usually employ the direct current (DC) approxima-
tion of power flows [3, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, 25, 30]. In this paper, we employ a simplified DC
model of a power grid which is equivalent to a resistor network [2] and follow the cascading
failure model of [6, 30].
Ref. [11] suggests that the distribution of blackouts in power grids follows a power law,
which is related to the phenomenon of self-organized criticality. Other authors suggest that
blackouts follow first-order phase transitions, in which the loss of power is either very small
or very large [24, 35]. The goal of this paper is to create a realistic model of a power grid
which mimics the US Western Interconnect (USWI), to discover whether large blackouts can
occur and to explore their distribution and spatial-temporal propagation, if they do occur.
Additionally, we study the dependency of blackout characteristics on power grid design.
For this reason, we introduce a synthetic Degree And Distance Attachment (DADA) model
[20, 34].
We show that the characteristics of blackouts are universal. However, the sizes of black-
outs are much smaller in the USWI-like model with a realistic design than in an artificial
DADA model with a different spatial organization. In particular, we study how the size of
the blackout and the dynamics of the cascading failures depend on a set of three parameters
of the model which characterize the robustness of the grid: (1) tolerance α of the lines to
overload, compared to their initial loads [21, 22]; (2) the minimum current Ip which any
line in the network can carry independent of its initial load; and (3) the interval of currents
of the transmission lines Iu−∆u to Iu, from which a line is randomly selected to initiate the
cascading failures. We characterize Ip and Iu by dimensionless parameters p and u: the level
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of protection, 0 < p ≤ 1, and the significance of initial failure, 0 < u ≤ 1, which are the
fraction of the lines with transmitting currents less than Ip and Iu, respectively.
We find that in a broad range of 1 ≤ α < 2, u ≥ 0.8, and 0 < p < 0.95, large blackouts
with final demand less than 80% of the initial demand may occur with a significant proba-
bility both in the USWI-like grid and in artificially constructed DADA grids. Moreover, we
find that in this range of parameters the distribution of yield is bimodal, which is consistent
with first-order phase transitions. Most importantly, we find that in each cascading failure
which leads to a large blackout there is a latent period during which the damage is localized
in space, few lines fail, and the decrease in yield is insignificant. The existence of this la-
tent period suggests that the majority of blackouts can be effectively stopped by the timely
intervention of grid operators. The length of the latent period increases as the tolerance α
increases. Another important discovery is that in the event of a large blackout, cascading
failures stop when the network breaks into small, disconnected islands.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we describe our methods
of constructing power grids and simulating cascading failures. In Section III we study the
properties of the USWI model and its cascading failures. Next, in Section IV we describe
the preferential Degree And Distance Attachment (DADA) model. In Section V we compare
the physical features and behavior of cascade simulations of the USWI model power grid
and the DADA model. Finally, in Section VI we discuss and summarize the results of our
study.
II. MODELS
In this section, we describe the network, flow model, and cascade model in detail.
A. Definition of the Grid Elements
We denote the set of all nodes asN and the set of all lines asE. Thus, a connected network
is defined as the ordered pair G = (N,E). We denote the power grid network by the graph G
consisting of n0 transmitting, n+ supply, and n− demand nodes. The total number of nodes
is n = n0 + n+ + n−. Each supply or demand node is specified by the amount of current it
supplies (I+i > 0) or by the amount of current it demands (I
−
i > 0). For transmitting nodes,
4
we assume I0i = 0. Due to the law of charge conservation,
∑
I+i =
∑
I−i . The network
is specified by the n × n symmetric resistance matrix with elements Rij , where Rij is the
resistance equivalent to the reactance value of the transmission line connecting nodes i and
j. If there is no direct transmission line connecting nodes i and j, we assume that Rij =∞.
Since the matrix with elements Rij is symmetric, the total number of transmitting lines l is
equal to the number of finite elements of the resistance matrix divided by two. Each node i
is connected to ki nodes by transmission lines, where ki is the number of finite elements in
the ith row of the resistance matrix. Thus ki represents the degree of node i and 〈k〉 is the
average degree of all nodes in the network. We denote the set of all neighbors of node i as
N(i).
B. Flow Model
We employ the simplified DC model of a power grid widely used in the engineering
community. This model is equivalent to flow equations in resistor networks. In this model
the powers flowing through each line are replaced by currents, the reactances of each line are
represented by resistances, and the phase angles are replaced by voltages. Each transmission
line connecting nodes i and j is characterized by its resistance Rij, while each node i is
characterized by its voltage Vi. The current Iij flowing from node i to node j is
Iij = (Vi − Vj)/Rij. (1)
Additionally, the sum of all the currents flowing into each node i is equal to the sum of all
currents flowing out: ∑
j∈N(i)
Iij = δ
+I+i − δ
−I−i , (2)
where δ+i = 1 or δ
−
i = 1 if a node i is a supply or a demand node respectively, and
δ+i = δ
−
i = 0 otherwise. The particular methods used to solve the system of equations
(1)-(2) can be found in Appendix A.
C. Cascading Failures Model
Once the system (1)-(2) is solved, we find the currents in all transmitting lines Iij and
define their maximum capacities I∗ij using the following two rules (Fig. 1): (i) we define Ip as
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the standard capacity of the lines. It is computed such that a fraction p of the lines initially
have currents below Ip. We refer to p as the level of protection. (ii) For each line we define
its individual capacity α|Iij|, where α ≥ 1 is the tolerance (i.e., the factor of safety). We
assume α to be the same for every transmission line in the grid. Using these rules,
I∗ij ≡ max(Ip, α|Iij|). (3)
If a current in line {ij} exceeds I∗ij , the line will fail.
The larger p and α are, the better the grid is protected against overloads. We usually
use p = 0.9 and vary α as the main parameter of grid resilience. We introduce the standard
capacity Ip because it would be unrealistic to assume that lines are built with very low
capacity. In fact, many lines in realistic power grids may be built for backup reasons, so
initially Iij = 0. Without standard load requirements any redistribution of currents in the
grid would lead to the failure of these backup lines, which contradicts their purpose.
To initiate a cascading failure, we randomly select and remove a single line for which the
current |Iij| belongs to the interval of currents [Iu−∆u, Iu], where the fraction u−∆u of lines
operate below Iu−∆u and the fraction u of lines operate below Iu (Fig. 1). Throughout this
paper we select ∆u = 0.1. Precisely, the parameter u specifies the significance of the lines
which are targeted for the initial failure. We refer to u as the significance of initial failure.
For example, u = 1.0 and ∆u = 0.1 means that the lines which initially fail are selected
from the top 10% of lines ranked according to their initial current.
Real power grids are usually designed in such a way that the removal of a single element
does not cause any instability in the system. This condition is called the N − 1 property.
For simplicity, this model does not have the N − 1 property. However, removing a single
line from a network without the N −1 property is the equivalent to removing two lines from
a network with the N − 1 property. Therefore, the properties of blackouts will be the same
for networks without the N − 1 property as for networks with the N − 1 property, given
equivalent line removals. The only difference is that the network with the N − 1 property
will be more stable because the probability of simultaneous failure of two significant lines is
much smaller than the probability of failure of one significant line.
It should be pointed out that removing a line can lead to disintegration of the grid into
two disconnected components, which we call clusters. Obviously, the supply and demand in
each cluster should be equalized to retain charge conservation. Thus, for each cluster Cj,
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Algorithm 1 Cascading Failures
Input: G0 = (N,E), α, p, u.
1: E0 ← E.
2: ∀{i, j} ∈ E calculate Iij.
3: Determine Ip for given p.
4: Choose a line {i, j} from the interval [Iu−∆u, Iu] of currents to fail; s ← 0, F0 ← {i, j} (s is
stage of cascade; Fs is set of lines failed during s
th stage of the cascade).
5: while Fs 6= ∅ do
6: for each cluster C do
7: Calculate
∑
i∈C I
+(s−1)
i and
∑
i∈C I
−(s−1)
i .
8: if
∑
i∈C I
+(s−1)
i >
∑
i∈C I
−(s−1)
i then
9: ∀i: I
+(s)
i ← I
+(s−1)
i ∗
(∑
i∈C I
−(s−1)
i∑
i∈C I
+(s−1)
i
)
10: else if
∑
i I
−(s)
i >
∑
i I
+(s)
i then
11: ∀i: I
−(s)
i ← I
−(s−1)
i ∗
(∑
i∈C I
+(s−1)
i∑
i∈C I
−(s−1)
i
)
12: end if
13: end for
14: Es+1 ← Es \ Fs.
15: Gs+1 ← Gs (Gs is the state of the grid at the s
th stage of the cascade).
16: for all {i, j} ∈ Es do
17: Calculate I
(s)
ij .
18: if |I
(s)
ij | > I
∗
ij then
19: Fs+1 ← Fs+1
⋃
{i, j}.
20: Gs+1 ← Gs+1 \ {i, j}.
21: end if
22: end for
23: s← s+ 1.
24: end while
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we compute
∑
i∈Cj
I+i and
∑
i∈Cj
I−i . If in a cluster
∑
i∈Cj
I+i >
∑
i∈Cj
I−i , we multiply the
current of each supply node in Cj by
∑
i∈Cj
I−i /
∑
i∈Cj
I+i < 1; if
∑
i∈Cj
I−i >
∑
i∈Cj
I+i , we
multiply the current of each demand node in Cj by
∑
i∈Cj
I+i /
∑
i∈Cj
I−i < 1 (see Algorithm
1.6). In this equalization method, we spread the decrease in current uniformly among all
the supply or demand nodes in Cj.
Then, we modify Eqs. (1)-(2), solve the resulting system of equations, and find new
potentials V
(1)
i and new currents I
(1)
ij . We also compute the total number of surviving lines
l1 = l − 1 and the total supplied current I1 =
∑
i I
+(1)
i =
∑
i I
−(1)
i , where I
+(1)
i and I
−(1)
i
are the new supply and demand currents, computed as described above if clusterization has
occurred. We define this situation as the first time step t = 1 of the cascade of failures.
At the second time step of the cascade, we remove all lines for which the new current |I(1)ij |
exceeds the predefined maximum load of this line, I∗ij. If no overloads have occurred, the
cascade has stopped and we assume If = I1 to be the final demand current of the process. If
some of the lines fail, we repeat the equalization algorithm, modify the system of equations
(1)-(2), calculate V
(2)
i and new currents I
(2)
ij , and compute the new total demand current I2
and the new total number of active lines l2.
We repeat this process recurrently until at a certain time step t of the cascade no lines
fail. We call this time step the final time step of the cascade, and compute If = It, lf = lt,
and the duration of the cascade f = t. The cascading failures algorithm is summarized in
Algorithm 1.
D. Metrics
We define here all the metrics we use to characterize the cascades of failures.
Cascade Duration, f : the number of time steps until a cascade stops.
Number of Active Lines, L = lf : the number of transmission lines in the grid that have
not failed by the end of the cascade.
Yield, Y (t): It
I0
, the ratio between the demand at time step t (It) and the original demand
(I0). For t = f , we simply denote yield by Y .
Large Blackout: Y ≤ 0.8, when the yield in the grid drops below the threshold of 80%.
Risk of Large Blackout, Π(α): the probability that the failure of a line will produce a
Large Blackout with Y < 0.8.
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Table 1. Parameters of the model
n+ The number of supply nodes
n− The number of demand nodes
n0 The number of transmitting nodes
I
+
i The current supplied by supply node i
I
−
i The current demanded by demand node i
Rij The resistance of the line connecting nodes i and j
Vi The voltage of node i
Iij The current traveling through the line connecting nodes i and j
α The tolerance of the lines
p The level of protection of the lines
u The significance of the initial failure
〈G〉: the average relative size (fraction of nodes) of the largest cluster at the end of the
cascade.
〈Y 〉: the average yield at the end of the cascade.
〈L〉: the average number of surviving lines at the end of the cascade.
Hop distance, hi: the shortest path measured in number of lines required to reach a
certain node i from the failed line.
Local Yield, Y (t, h):
Y (t, h) =
∑
i∈H(h) I
−(t)
i∑
i∈H(h) I
−
i
(4)
where H(h) is the subset of demand nodes a given hop distance h from the failed line.
Blackout Radius of Gyration, rB(t): a quantitative measure of the blackout’s geometric
dimension as a function of the cascade time step t,
rB(t)
2 =
〈∑
i∈B(t) h
2
i I
−(t)
i
〉
〈∑
i∈B(t) I
−
i
〉 , (5)
where the summation is made over the set B(t) of totally disconnected demand nodes which
do not receive any current at the tth time step of the cascade. The average is done either
over all runs resulting in a large blackout or all runs not resulting in a large blackout.
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tl: duration of the latent period, i.e., the time step of the cascade of failures at which
Y (tl) drops below 95%.
III. CASCADES IN USWI
In this section we simulate the cascades on the USWI network obtained from [6]. The
network is based on real power grid topology data of the western US taken from the Platts
Geographic Information System (GIS) [26] and includes approximate information about
transmission lines based on their lengths, supplies based on power plants’ capacities, and
demands based on the population at each location.
A. USWI Properties
The USWI power grid data contains 8050 transmitting nodes, 1197 supply nodes, 3888
demand nodes, and 17544 transmission lines connecting them. To avoid exposing possible
vulnerabilities in the actual USWI, our data set does not include the geographic coordinates
of nodes. It does, however, include the length of each line rij connecting nodes i and j. We
define the resistances of the lines to be proportional to their lengths Rij = ρrij , where ρ is
a constant. The data set also specifies the supply (I+i ) and demand (I
−
i ) of each relevant
node.
1. Degree Distribution
The USWI power grid is characterized by a fat-tail degree distribution of nodes (Fig. 2(a)),
which can be approximated by a power law P (k) ≈ k−3 with an exponential cut-off. The
degree distributions of transmitting nodes, supply nodes, and demand nodes are quite similar
to each other (Fig. 2(a)). The average degree 〈k〉 of the nodes in the USWI is 2.67. For
supply nodes, it is slightly larger (2.88); for demand nodes, it is very slightly smaller (2.61).
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2. Length Distribution
The length distribution of lines for the USWI has an approximately lognormal shape
with power law tails. Figure 3(a) shows lnP (ln rij), the logarithm of the probability density
function (PDF) of ln rij . For the lognormal distribution the graph would be a perfect
parabola. Instead, we see that both tails of the distribution can be well approximated by
straight lines with slope ν− = 0.77 for the left tail and slope ν+ = −1.44 for the right tail.
This means that the PDF of rij can be approximated by power laws P (r) ≈ r
ν−−1 for r → 0
and P (r) ≈ rν+−1 for r →∞. The extra term −1 comes from the equivalence of cumulative
distribution functions P (r > r0) = P (ln r > ln r0), from which, differentiating with respect
to r0, we obtain P (r0) = P (ln r0)d ln(r0)/dr0 = P (ln(r0))/r0.
A very small power for the left tail indicates an intriguing possibility that the USWI
forms a fractal set with fractal dimension D = 0.77 < 2. Indeed, if the mass (number of
nodes) within a circle of radius r scales as arD, it follows from the Poisson distribution
that the probability to find an empty circle of radius r surrounding a given power station
is exp(−arD). The derivative of this function is ∼ rD−1 for r → 0. This is the probability
density of the distances to the nearest neighbors, which should be a good approximation
to the left tail of P (r). Accordingly, the slope of the left tail ν− = D. The fractality of
the population distribution was suggested in a number of works [4, 19]. This is particularly
plausible for the US western regions, in which densely populated areas are separated by
deserts and mountains.
3. Distribution of Supply, Demand, and Line Currents
The supplies (demands) in the USWI approximately follow a lognormal distribution, with
a sharp cut-off in the right tail, indicating the existence of a technical upper limit for the
supplies (demands) (see Fig. 4). Using this data we solve equations (1)-(2) and find the
currents of transmission lines Iij . The cumulative distribution function of currents in the
USWI model is roughly exponential (Fig. 5), with about 10% extremely small currents.
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B. Properties of Cascades in USWI
1. Bimodality of the Yield Distribution
The most important metric for studying cascading failures is the yield Y . The yield
critically depends on the initially failed line. We fix parameters of the model (α and p) and
simulate the cascade initiated by the failure of a line selected from an interval of currents
[Iu−∆u, Iu]. We measure yield and repeat this procedure Q = 100 times. Next we construct
the histogram of yields.
The interesting feature of the yield histogram is its pronounced bimodality (Fig. 6(a)),
which can be detected by a plateau in the cumulative yield distribution (Fig. 7(a)). The
bimodality of the yield distribution is present in a large region of the parameter space
(α, p, u), characterized by relatively small α < 2, practically all p ≤ 0.95, and relatively
large u > 0.8. The tolerance parameter α is identical to the tolerance α + 1 of the Motter
model [21, 22]. We find the same general behavior as in the Motter model, that as α increases
the probability of a large blackout decreases (Fig. 7(a)).
One can see (Fig. 7(a)) that the distribution of yield clearly remains bimodal for α < 2
for the USWI model. Similar behavior can be observed in the Motter model and the mutual
percolation model, where the collapse transition is shown to be a first-order transition (all-or-
nothing transition) [10, 18, 21, 22, 35]. In Section IID we defined large blackouts as having
Y < 0.8. The motivation behind this definition is that there is a gap in the cumulative
distribution of the yield between Y = Y1 and Y = Y2 that separates severe cascades from
mild ones. It is possible to select Ym = 0.8 as a value of Y that belongs to the interval
[Y1(α, p, u), Y2(α, p, u)] for a large section of the parameter space where the bimodality is
observed. Thus this value can be used as a universal threshold which separates severe
blackouts from mild blackouts. For large α, the gap in the yield distribution reduces and
eventually disappears for α ≥ 2.
2. Risk of Large Blackouts
The ensemble of cascades can be characterized by two important parameters of the out-
come: (i) the probability of a large blackout P (Y < 0.8), which we call the risk of a large
blackout Π(α), and (ii) the average blackout yield 〈Y 〉, for the cases of large blackouts.
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Figs. 8(a) and 8(b) show how the risk of large blackouts Π(α) decreases as α increases
for different values of u and p. We find that for different values of u and p, the shapes of the
curves Π(α) remain approximately constant, but the curves significantly shift in a horizontal
direction. This means that the curves Π(α) can be well approximated by Π (α− α0(u, p)).
The function α0(u, p) can be defined by solving the equation Π (α0(u, p)) = 1/2 with respect
to α0(u, p). One can see that α0(u, p = 0.5) is an approximately linear function of u, which
increases with u (Fig. 9(a)). This means that the higher the current of the initially failed
line, the larger the tolerance necessary to achieve the same degree of protection for the
transmission lines. In other words, the same effect can be achieved either by protecting a
certain fraction of the most significant lines from spontaneous failure, or by increasing the
tolerance of all the lines by some quantity (Fig. 9(a)). The dependence of the risk on p is
weaker than on u, especially for p ≤ 0.5 (Fig. 9(b)). An increase in p has practically no
effect on increasing the robustness of the grid. The increase in p achieves a significant effect
on the risk of large blackouts only when p approaches 0.9.
3. Characteristics of Large Blackouts
Large blackouts can be characterized by their average yield 〈Y 〉, average fraction of
surviving lines 〈L〉, and the average fraction of nodes in the largest connected component of
the grid 〈G〉. These metrics only weakly depend on u, but are strongly increasing functions
of α (Fig. 10(a)). The independence of the characteristics of large blackouts on u stems
from the fact that the properties of large blackouts, if they occur, do not depend on a
particular line to initiate the failure. The risk of large blackouts depends on u, but the
average parameters of large blackouts do not.
The dependence of these metrics on p is more complex (Fig. 10(b)). While the yield 〈Y 〉
starts to increase only for p > 0.7, the number of survived lines 〈L〉 significantly increases
with p even for small p. This is not surprising since p is the level of protection of the lines,
and fewer lines fail if more lines are protected. As p approaches 1, the dependence of 〈L〉
on α becomes very weak. The explanation of this fact is based on the notion that 〈L〉 is
computed only for the case of large blackouts. For a large blackout to occur, a significant
fraction of lines must fail, sufficient to disconnect a large fraction of demand nodes. On the
other hand, as α increases, the risk of a large blackout decreases to zero, so the average
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fraction of lines surviving for all the cascades (large and small) approaches 1.
Another important observation from Fig. 10(b) is the very small dependence of 〈G〉 on
the parameters α, p, and u, as opposed to 〈L〉. Hence, by removing a small fraction of
the lines (20%) the grid disintegrates into many small clusters, each less than 20% of the
total size. Indeed, percolation theory predicts that close to the percolation threshold, it
is sufficient to delete an infinitesimally small fraction of the so called “red” bonds (which
form a fractal set with fractal dimension 3/4) to divide the network into a set of small
disconnected components [14].
C. Latent Period of the Cascade
The cascading failures that do not result in large blackouts (Y > 0.8) are usually short
(f < 8) (Figs. 11(a) and 11(b)). In contrast, the duration of cascades resulting in large
blackouts Y ≤ 0.8 increases with α, reaching values of order 40 for large α. This means that
for large tolerances, it takes much longer for the blackout to spread over a large area, since
at each time step only a few lines have a huge overload and fail.
In the cascades resulting in large blackouts, the fraction of the consumed current, Y (t),
decreases with time in a non-trivial way (Fig. 12(a)). During the first few time steps of
the cascades, the yield does not significantly decrease since the current can successfully
redistribute over the remaining lines without disconnection of the demand nodes. This
period, in which the cascade is still localized and a blackout has not yet occurred, can be
called the latent period of the cascade. The recognition of this latent period is important since
it is a period in which a cascade is beginning to spread but has not yet grown uncontrollable.
In the latent period it may still be possible to intervene and redistribute current flow to stop
the cascade before it becomes a large blackout.
We define the duration of this latent period of the cascade as the time step at which the
yield drops below 0.95. At approximately this time step the yield starts to rapidly decrease
and then, towards the end of the cascade, stabilizes again. The shape of this function
is characteristic of an abrupt first-order transition observed in simpler models of network
failure [10, 22]. Remarkably, the duration of the latent period is a linear function of tolerance
(Fig. 12(b)).
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D. Cascade Spatial Spreading
To observe the spatial spread of the reduction of demand for each run, we group the grid’s
demand nodes into bins based on their “hop distance” from the original failed line. In each
bin we compute the local yield Y (t, h). We average the local yield Y (t, h) for runs resulting
in large blackouts (Fig. 13(a)). The yield in each bin at the end of cascades resulting in
large blackouts is almost independent of the distance from the initially failed line. While at
the beginning of the cascade the blackout is localized near the initially failed line, eventually
the blackout spreads uniformly over the entire system. Delocalization occurs at the end of
the latent period of the cascade. This can be clearly seen from the behavior of the blackout
profiles, which start to rapidly drop down for large distances only at intermediate time steps
of the cascade.
To give a more quantitative measure of the blackout spread, we use the “blackout radius
of gyration” (rB(t)) metric defined in Section IID. Fig. 14 shows the behavior of rB(t)
2
versus the cascade time step t for the cascades which result in small blackouts (Fig. 14(a))
and large blackouts (Fig. 14(b)). We observe the same phenomena — initially rB(t)
2 grows
slowly in the runs resulting in large and small blackouts. However, while in runs resulting
in small blackouts the cascade stops during this latent period, in runs resulting in large
blackouts the cascade starts to rapidly spread over a large area. It should still be noted,
though, that the rate of this spread decreases when tolerance increases.
E. Main Lessons Learned from the Cascades in the USWI model
1. The yield has a pronounced bimodality, for which a grid suffers either a large blackout
with Y < 80% or a very small reduction of demand with Y > 90%.
2. Increasing tolerance α decreases the probability Π(α) of a large cascade with low yield.
3. The higher the significance of the initially failed line u, the larger the tolerance α
necessary to prevent cascades. Thus, the same effect can be achieved by protecting a
certain fraction of the most important lines from spontaneous failure as by increasing
the tolerance α of all lines.
4. 〈Y 〉 strongly depends on α and weakly depends on u. It increases with p for only
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p > 0.7.
5. 〈L〉 also strongly depends on α and weakly depends on u. It increases with p even for
small p.
6. 〈G〉 weakly depends on α and practically does not depend on p and u. This suggests
that in large blackouts the grid disintegrates into very small clusters.
7. Cascades which do not result in large blackouts are usually short. Cascades resulting
in large blackouts usually take a large number of time steps, and the number of time
steps increases with α.
8. There is a latent period during which the reduction in demand is small and not many
lines have failed. During this period, it may be possible to intervene and optimally
redistribute current flow to prevent the cascade from growing uncontrollable and to
prevent a large blackout. The duration of the latent period linearly increases with α.
9. In cascades resulting in large blackouts, the reduction in demand usually begins in the
vicinity of the initially failed line and the blackout remains localized near the initially
failed line until the end of the latent period.
10. For cascades resulting in large blackouts, the final local yield is almost independent of
the distance from the initially failed line.
IV. DEGREE AND DISTANCE ATTACHMENT MODEL
In the previous section we find that cascading failures in the USWI model have charac-
teristic features of a first-order transition: the bimodal distribution of yield and the latent
period during which the damage to the network is insignificant. It is important to inves-
tigate whether these features are due to particular characteristics of the USWI design, or
whether they are universal features of a much broader class of models. Moreover, the data
on real grids are limited and therefore it is important to develop algorithms for generating
synthetic grids resembling known real grids. The two basic features of USWI that we would
like to reproduce are the degree distribution and the distribution of line lengths. The degree
distribution of the USWI discussed in Section III is in agreement with the Baraba´si-Albert
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preferential attachment model [1, 5]. Accordingly we use the Baraba´si-Albert model as the
basis of the synthetic model. In the original Baraba´si-Albert model, a newly created node
is attached to an existing node with a probability proportional to the degree of this node.
However, for power grids embedded in two-dimensional space, the length distribution of
lines, resulting from the degree preferential attachment, would not decrease with the length.
Therefore, in order to create a grid with a decreasing length distribution, one must introduce
a penalty for attaching to a distant node. Here we will employ the Degree And Distance At-
tachment (DADA) model with a distance penalty developed in Refs. [20, 34]. This method
produces degree and length distributions similar to those of the USWI (see Section IIIA).
The DADA model randomly generates nodes j = 1, 2, ...n on a plane with a uniform
density one by one. It connects each new node j to an existing node i based on i’s degree
and distance with probability P({i, j}) ∝ ki/rij
µ, where ki is a current degree of node i
and rij is the distance between nodes i and j. This rule mimics the way real networks are
evolved. A real network such as the USWI is not planned all at once; rather, new stations are
added to the grid as necessity dictates. The probability of connection P({i, j}) ∝ ki/rij
µ is
assumed to be proportional to ki, since connections to nodes of high degree are more reliable,
but also inversely proportional to a power of rij , since construction of long transmission lines
costs more. The distance penalty µ is a factor which seeks to optimize the balance between
reliability and cost (see Algorithm 2.21). As in USWI, we assume that in the DADA model
Rij = ρrij , where ρ is resistivity, which is constant for all the lines in the system.
Refs. [20, 34] show that for µ < 1, the degree distribution of the DADA model is a power
law P (k) ≈ k−3, while for µ > 1, it becomes a stretched exponential [13]. However, the fat-
tail of the stretched exponential can be approximated by a power law P (k) ≈ k−γ with an
exponent γ > 3 (Fig. 2(b)). Ref. [20] also shows that the line length distribution P (rij) ≈ rij
for rij → 0, and for large µ, P (rij) ≈ r
−3
ij for rij → ∞. The functional form of P (rij) for
the DADA and USWI models are similar, but the exponents are different. As mentioned
in Section IIIA 2 regarding the USWI model, these asymptotic behaviors correspond to the
slopes ν− = 2 and ν+ = −2 of the logarithmic distribution P (ln(rij)) observed in the DADA
model (Fig. 3(b)), while for the USWI model these values are ν− = 0.77 and ν+ = −1.43.
In our simulations, we select µ = 6. For this choice of µ, the degree distribution exponent
γ ≈ 4.3, while −ν+ = 2. The corresponding values in the USWI model are smaller. Both
γ and −ν+ can be decreased by decreasing µ, so that the degree and length distributions
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of the DADA model would be closer to those of the USWI. However, upon doing so, our
results on the distribution of currents in the DADA model and properties of the cascading
failures do not change significantly, indicating that the observed features of the cascades are
quite universal. The discrepancy in ν− for the DADA and USWI is related to the fact that
in the DADA model the nodes are spread on the plane with a uniform density, while in the
USWI model the density of nodes is related to the population density which has fractal-like
features.
A. Construction of the DADA model
In this subsection, we will describe in detail the construction of the DADA model [20, 34].
We generate the coordinates (xi, yi) of n nodes randomly with a homogeneous density n/S
2
over the (S × S) square with periodic boundary conditions. For this periodic square, the
distance rij between two points with coordinates (xi, yi) and (xj , yj) is computed as
rij =
√
∆x2 +∆y2, (6)
where ∆x = min (|xi − xj |, |S − |xi − xj ||) and ∆y = min (|yi − yj|, |S − |yi − yj||). We
select S = 1. Periodic boundary conditions are often used in statistical physics to minimize
finite size effects [27]. Our goal is to create a grid with a given number of lines, l. We start
by randomly placing nodes onto the grid one by one until we have a total of n nodes (see
Algorithm 2.3). When each new node is created, we connect it on average to ℓ¯ = l/n = 〈k〉/2
preexisting nodes in order to achieve our goal of creating a grid with a given number of lines
l. Since ℓ¯ is a real number, we preassign to each node i an integer ℓi, the number of lines by
which it will be connected to the previously generated nodes, according to Algorithm 2.4.
We randomly select l− n⌊ℓ¯⌋ < n nodes, where ⌊ℓ¯⌋ is the integer part of ℓ¯. For these nodes,
we choose ℓi = ⌊ℓ¯⌋+1. For the rest of the nodes, we choose ℓi = ⌊ℓ¯⌋. For each new node j, we
attempt to create ℓj lines with the previously existing nodes. If j ≤ ℓj, then we connect j to
all preexisting nodes (see Algorithm 2.10), as we cannot create ℓj lines without duplicating
lines. If j ≥ ℓj, there are more existing nodes than ℓj and we create lines according to the
following rule (see Algorithm 2.17). First we compute the distances rij between the new
node j and all existing nodes i < j (see Algorithm 2.20). Next we assign to each existing
node i a probability P({i, j}) of connecting to the new node j, proportional to ki/r
µ
ij, where
18
Algorithm 2 DADA Model Construction
1: Select a random subset Λ of size l − ℓ¯n from {1, 2...n}.
2: for j ← 1 to n do
3: Choose coordinates xj and yj between 0 and S.
4: Choose integer number ℓj:
5: if j ∈ Λ then
6: ℓj = ⌊ℓ¯⌋+ 1.
7: else
8: ℓj = ⌊ℓ¯⌋.
9: end if
10: if j ≤ ℓj then
11: for all i < j do
12: Connect j to i.
13: end for
14: kj ← j − 1.
15: else
16: kj ← 0.
17: while kj < ℓj do
18: for all i < j do
19: if j is not directly connected to i then
20: Compute rij .
21: Assign Probability P({i, j}) ∝ ki/rij
µ.
22: else
23: P({i, j}) = 0.
24: end if
25: end for
26: Choose node i from distribution P({i, j}) ∝ ki/rijµ and connect it to j.
27: kj ← kj + 1.
28: end while
29: end if
30: end for
31: return G. 19
ki is the degree of node i and µ is a parameter giving the penalty for distance (see Algorithm
2.21). We then connect the new node to a node chosen from this probability distribution
(see Algorithm 2.26). We repeat this step ℓj times, with the additional condition that all
nodes i already directly connected to node j have probability of connecting P({i, j}) = 0
instead of P({i, j}) ∝ ki/r
µ
ij (see Algorithm 2.23). At the end, a total of almost nℓ = l lines
are created.
For the USWI network ℓ¯ = 〈k〉/2 ≈ 1.5, so for the DADA model we choose ℓ¯ = 1.5 (more
accurate values of ℓ¯ do not significantly affect our results). As mentioned in Section III, the
average degree 〈k〉 of the USWI network is 2.67. For supply nodes, it is slightly larger (2.88);
for demand nodes, it is very slightly smaller (2.61). Averaging over 100 different grids, our
DADA model has slightly higher average degree of 2.84. More accurate values of ℓ¯ do not
significantly change the cascading properties of the DADA model.
After placing n nodes and l lines, we randomly assign n+ supply nodes and (different)
n− demand nodes. Our network was simulated with n = 13135, n− = 3888, and n+ = 1197
to match the USWI. We assign the supply and demand nodes independent of degree. Thus
the average degrees of the supply and demand nodes are the same as the average degree of
the DADA model.
Since the supplies and demands of the USWI have an approximately lognormal distribu-
tion (see Fig. 4), we generate currents of supplies and demands in the DADA model following
a modified lognormal distribution:
I+i = e
νiσ
++m+ lnki, (7)
for supplies and
I−i = e
νiσ
−+m− ln ki, (8)
for demands, where νi is randomly generated according to a standard normal distribution,
σ± is a standard deviation, and m± is a parameter which creates a correlation between the
node’s current and its degree.
Furthermore, since it is unrealistic to have nodes with very high supply and demand vales,
we introduce a cut-off a±σ±, where a± is a parameter of the model such that we accept only
I±i ≤ e
a±σ± . Thus, the supply and demand of each node is
I±i = min
(
eνiσ
±+m± ln ki, ea
±σ±
)
. (9)
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This cut-off corresponds to the sharp drops of the right tails of the supply and demand
distributions in the USWI (Fig. 4).
To best match the USWI data, we let the values of m± be the slopes of the regression
lines of the log-log scatter plots which plot the average supply/demand versus the degree of
corresponding nodes. We then select values of σ and a so that the distributions simulated
for the DADA model best match the USWI distributions (Fig. 4). We obtain σ+ = 2.0,
m+ = 0.38924, a+ = 1.6, σ− = 1.8, m− = 0.62826, and a− = 1.2.
V. COMPARISON OF THE USWI AND DADA MODELS
Here we compare the main results from the USWI model and the DADA model. We
also discuss reasons for the differences observed. The cumulative distribution of currents in
the DADA model closely follows the exponential distribution of currents in the USWI grid
(Fig. 5). This is important because the ratio of currents in the two models corresponding
to the same significance of lines u is approximately constant.
A. Evolution of Cascades
The distribution of the yield Y in the DADA model is also bimodal for approximately
the same set of parameters α, u, and p as in the USWI model, but the gap between the two
modes is significantly wider in the DADA model than in the USWI model (Fig. 7). Figure
7 compares the yield distributions of the USWI and DADA models for u = 1 and p = 0.9
for several values of 1 ≤ α < 2. Both models always collapse (Y < 0.8) for small values of
α, and survive (Y > 0.8) for large values of α. But for the DADA values, chances of large
blackout (risk) are smaller for the same set of parameters than in the USWI model. For
example, the DADA model can still survive with a small probability for α = 1.2, but the
USWI always collapses for α < 1.3. Conversely, we do not observe any large blackouts in
the DADA model for α > 1.7, while the USWI model can still have large blackouts even
for α = 1.9. Thus, even though in the event of a large blackout the average yield in the
USWI is greater than in the DADA model (and thus, in this sense, the DADA model is
more vulnerable than the USWI model), the risk of large blackouts is greater in the USWI
model than in the DADA model for the same set of parameters.
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These differences may be related to the fractal structure of the USWI, in which densely
populated areas with lot of demand and supply nodes are separated by large patches of
empty land over which few long transmission lines are built, whereas the DADA model has
constant density of nodes. Thus, it is less likely that the cascade will spread over the entire
grid in the USWI model than in the DADA model, but a higher tolerance is necessary to
prevent large blackouts in the USWI model than in the DADA model.
Qualitatively, the behaviors of the metrics 〈Y 〉, 〈L〉, and 〈G〉 are similar in the USWI
model and in the DADA model, but in the DADA model the survival quantities are always
smaller for the same α, u, and p. This indicates that, remarkably, the artificial DADA
model is more vulnerable than the USWI model based on actual data (Figs. 8, 9, and 10).
The values of 〈G〉 in the DADA model are very small, indicating that in the event of a
large blackout the DADA network disintegrates into very small connected components, each
constituting about 1% of the nodes of the grid. In the USWI grid, the average largest
component is larger, because USWI grid consists of several dense areas connected by few
long lines. The overload of these long lines breaks the USWI grid into relatively large
disconnected components, preventing the cascade from further spreading.
B. Cascade Temporal Dynamics
The spatial and temporal behaviors of the cascades in the DADA model closely follow
the behaviors in the USWI model (Figs. 11, 12, 13, and 14). rB(t)
2 in the DADA model
is much smaller than in the USWI model due to the different structures of the models and
difference in diameters of the networks. The longest distance (in terms of number of hops)
between any two nodes (i.e. diameter of the network) in the DADA model is ≈ 16, while in
the USWI model it is ≈ 41. In both models we see that the cascade spreads more quickly for
smaller α than for larger α. However, the first-order all-or-nothing nature of the cascades,
characterized by a latent period during which the blackout is small and localized followed
by a fast blackout spread over a large area, is common in both models.
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C. Cascade Spatial Spreading
The DADA model has an advantage over the USWI model, that in the former we know
the exact coordinates of the nodes and thus we can illustrate the spatial and temporal
evolution of the blackout as a sequence of snapshots on the (x, y) plane. Fig. 15 shows
spatial snapshots of the cascading failures taken at different time steps for the DADA model
with parameters α = 1.8 and p = 0.4. The color of a line indicates the time step of the
cascade at which this line has failed. One can see that during first 3 time steps of the cascade
(red lines) the area of line failures is small and localized near the initial failure. The cascade
starts to spread during time steps 4-8 (orange and yellow-green), but the area of line failures
is still localized. At time step 10 the cascade quickly spreads to very distant parts of the
system (green). The blue and violet lines are the final time steps of the cascade. Thus,
the figure suggests that there is a latent period of the cascade during which the area of line
failures is small and localized.
VI. CONCLUSION
The DADA model and the USWI model have many common features. The physical
features, such as the distribution of degrees, resistances, and currents, compare well in both
models. The behavior of the cascades of failures in the DADA model is also similar to their
behavior in the USWI model power grid, despite the differences in construction of these
models.
The overloads and cascading failures in the USWI and DADA models have features of
all-or-nothing transition, just like in a broad spectrum of more primitive models such as the
Motter model [21, 22]. In the Motter model, instead of currents, the betweenness of each
node in a graph is computed and the maximum load of each node is defined as its original
betweenness multiplied by the tolerance. Then, a random node is taken out, simulating an
initial failure, and the new betweenness of each node is calculated. If the new betweenness of
a node exceeds its maximum load, this node is taken out and the entire process is repeated.
The yield in the Motter model is defined as the fraction of survived nodes at the end of the
cascade. The distribution of the yield in the Motter model is bimodal for a large range of
tolerances. Similarly, in a wide range of parameters, both the DADA model and the USWI
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power grid are in a metastable state and there exists the risk that the failure of a single
line will lead to a large blackout, in which the yield falls below 80%. As tolerance increases
beyond 2.0, the risk of a large blackout decreases almost to 0.
The level of line protection, p, increases the robustness of the grid, but to a lesser extent
than does the tolerance. An important parameter defining the robustness of the grid is the
significance of the initial failure u. The risk of a large blackout increases with u in the same
way as with tolerance. Given a particular α, when u is small, there is practically no risk
of a large blackout, while when u approaches 1, the risk is maximal for the given α. If α
is kept constant and u decreases, there is the same effect on the risk of a large blackout as
when α increases and u is kept constant, meaning that the same effect could be achieved by
protecting important lines as by increasing the overall tolerance. Nevertheless, even if the
initially failed lines are selected irrespective of their currents (u = ∆u = 1), the distribution
of yields remains bimodal, but the probability of large blackouts significantly decreases.
Upon failure of a line, the first few cascade time steps affect only the immediate vicinity
of the failed line. This is the latent period of the cascade, during which it may be feasible
to intervene and redistribute the current flow and possibly prevent a large blackout from
occurring. At some time step, the cascade may begin to spread quickly, and only then will
a large blackout occur. In this case, the blackout radius increases rapidly with cascade time
steps, but with a lower rate for higher values of α. Once the failure has spread over the
entire grid, the cascade continues to overload a small number of lines before terminating. At
this time step the grid completely disintegrates into small disconnected clusters. During the
first few time steps of the cascade, the demand does not significantly decrease, but starts to
quickly drop at the end of the latent period. The duration of the latent period of the cascade
linearly increases with the overall tolerance and provides sufficient time for grid operators
to intervene and stop the cascade.
Similar phenomena were observed during the large blackout of August 14th 2003. It is well
documented [23] that the power outage, which affected a large portion of the Northeastern
region of the USA on August 14th 2003, was caused by line overloads due to a heat-wave. But
what might have been a manageable local blackout cascaded into massive widespread distress
on the electric power grid. Power was not re-distributed after overloaded transmission lines
hit unpruned foliage, and the spreading of blackout was exacerbated over a time period of
30 minutes. This example closely resembles the large blackout scenario predicted by our
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models. Thus, our model provides useful understanding of general features of the cascades
of failures in power grids, which may be used for increasing the resilience of power grids and
designing optimal shedding strategies for preventing cascades from spreading.
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VIII. FIGURES
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Schematic illustration of the rules of cascading failures. The black solid
line represents the cumulative distribution of currents in transmission lines. The green solid line
indicates the fraction p of uniformly protected lines and the current Ip corresponding to this
fraction. Blue solid lines indicate the initial loads of two transmission lines I1 and I2. Blue dashed
lines indicate the maximum loads of these lines αI1 and αI2, defined using the tolerance parameter
α. Since αI1 < Ip, the actual maximum load for line 1 is Ip. In contrast, since αI2 > Ip, the actual
maximum load for line 2 is αI2. Red lines show the maximum and the minimum fraction of lines,
and their corresponding currents, from which region the initially failed lines can be selected for
given parameters u and ∆u.
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FIG. 2: Degree Distributions of (a): the USWI power grid, and (b): the DADA model for µ = 6,
ℓ = 1.5.
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FIG. 3: Distribution of the line lengths, which are the same as resistances, in (a): the USWI power
grid, and (b): the DADA with µ = 6, ℓ = 1.5.
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FIG. 4: Distribution of the supplied and demanded currents in the USWI power grid. Currents
are portrayed in arbitrary units.
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FIG. 5: Cumulative distribution of currents for the USWI model power grid and DADA model
with µ = 6 and ℓ = 1.5. (Currents are measured in arbitrary units.)
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FIG. 6: Distribution of yield for α = 1.6, p = 0.9, and u = 1.0. One can clearly see the bimodality
of the distribution with two peaks for high yield 0.975 and low yield 0.625, with practically no yields
between 0.75 and 0.9 for the USWI (a). Similarly for the DADA, one can clearly see the bimodality
of the distribution with two peaks for high yield 0.975 and low yield 0.425, with practically no yields
between 0.5 and 0.95 (b).
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FIG. 7: Cumulative distribution of the yield for p = 0.9, u = 1.0 and various values of α for (a) the
USWI model, and (b) the DADA model with µ = 6, ℓ = 1.5. The large gap in the distributions is
a feature of the abrupt first-order transition. For the USWI, u = 1.0 means that the distribution
is obtained by running 100 simulations with the initial removal of one of the top 100 lines with the
largest initial currents.
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FIG. 8: Probability of large blackout P (Y < 0.8), or risk Π(α), as function of α. (a) USWI model
for different values of u and p = 0.5. (b) USWI model for different values of p and u = 0.9. (c)
DADA model for different values of u and p = 0.5. (d) DADA model for different values of p and
u = 0.9.
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FIG. 9: Behavior of α0(u, p) defined as the value of α such that r(α, u, p) = 0.5 as function of u
at constant p = 0.5 (a) and as function of p at constant u = 0.9 (b).
31
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
α
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
<
G
>,
 <
Y
>,
 <
L>
u=0.3
u=0.4
u=0.5
u=0.6
u=0.7
u=0.8
u=0.9
u=1.0
<Y>
<G>
<L>
(a)USWI, p = 0.5
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
α
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
<
G
>,
 <
Y
>,
 <
L>
p=0.1
p=0.2
p=0.3
p=0.4
p=0.5
p=0.6
p=0.7
p=0.8
p=0.9
<Y>
<G>
<L>
(b)USWI, u = 0.9
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
α
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
<
G
>,
 <
Y
>,
 <
L>
u=0.3
u=0.4
u=0.5
u=0.6
u=0.7
u=0.8
u=0.9
u=1.0
<L>
<Y>
<G>
(c)DADA, p = 0.5
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
α
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
<
G
>,
 <
Y
>,
 <
L>
p=0.1
p=0.2
p=0.3
p=0.4
p=0.5
p=0.6
p=0.7
p=0.8
p=0.9
<L>
<Y>
<G>
(d)DADA, u = 0.9
FIG. 10: Behavior of the yield 〈Y 〉, the fraction of nodes in the largest connected component 〈G〉,
and the fraction of survived lines 〈L〉 averaged only over runs which resulted in large blackouts
(y < 0.8) as a function of α for different u and a fixed value of p = 0.5 (a) USWI model and (c)
DADA model, and different p at fixed u = 0.9 (b) USWI model and (d) DADA model. The small
〈G〉 in the DADA model is a feature of the symmetry of the model network and the long lengths
of the first links constructed (as necessitated by [3]).
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FIG. 11: Dependence of the average duration of the cascade on tolerance α. (a) USWI model and
(c) DADA model for different u at p = 0.5. (b) USWI model and (d) DADA model for different
p at u = 0.9. The dependence of the duration of the cascade on both u and p is weak. For each
u and p there are two lines: one for cascades resulting in large blackouts with yield Y < 0.8, and
another for cascades resulting in small blackouts Y > 0.8. The duration of the cascades in the
large blackout cases is always larger than 10 and is increasing with α, while for the cases with small
blackouts the cascades are short. Here we see the cascade slows down with higher α, so higher α
means higher resilience and longer latent periods. This shows the resilience of the grid is based on
α.
33
0 10 20 30 40 50
t
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Y
(t)
α=1.0
α=1.1
α=1.2
α=1.3
α=1.4
α=1.5
α=1.6
α=1.7
α=1.8
α=1.9
(a)USWI
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
α−1
0
5
10
15
t l
(b)USWI
0 10 20 30 40 50
t
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Y
(t)
α=1.0
α=1.1
α=1.2
α=1.3
α=1.4
α=1.5
α=1.6
α=1.7
α=1.8
α=1.9
(c)DADA
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
α−1
0
5
10
15
t l
(d)DADA
FIG. 12: Decrease in the demanded current as a function of the cascade time step during the
cascades resulting in large blackouts for (a) the USWI model and (c) the DADA model. The latent
period at the beginning of the cascade, during which there is no significant decrease in the demand,
linearly increases with tolerance α for both (b) the USWI model and (d) the DADA model. In
both USWI and DADA models u = 1.0, p = 0.9.
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FIG. 13: The fraction of current reaching demand nodes as a function of hop distance in runs
resulting in large blackouts for different cascade time steps, with p = 0.9 and α = 1.6, (a) for the
USWI data, and (b) for the DADA model with µ = 6, ℓ = 1.5.
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FIG. 14: The averaged behavior of the radius of gyration of the cascading failures in small blackouts
Y > 0.80 in (a) the USWI model and (c) the DADA model, and large blackouts with Y < 0.80 in
(b) the USWI model and (d) the DADA model. rB(t)
2 in the DADA model is much smaller than
it is in the USWI model due to the different structures of the models and difference in diameters
of the networks. The longest distance between any two nodes (i.e. diameter of the network) in the
DADA model is ≈ 16, while in the USWI model it is ≈ 41. In both models we see that the cascade
spreads more quickly for smaller α than for larger α.
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FIG. 15: (Color online) Propagation of a cascade of failures for α = 1.8, p = 0.4, u = 1 in the
DADA model with 13135 nodes, ℓ = 1.5, µ = 6. Lines that failed at different time steps of the
cascade are shown with different colors. The line randomly selected to fail due to spontaneous
failure or attack is portrayed as the center of the grid and is surrounded by a gray circle.
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Appendix A: Solving Flow Equqations
In the direct current approximation, the outgoing current from node i through a trans-
mitting line with resistance Rij is Iij = (Vi − Vj)/Rij , where Vi and Vj are the potentials of
nodes i and j respectively. In addition to the transmitting lines we have to take into account
the currents generated by the supply nodes I+i and the currents consumed by the demand
nodes I−i . In the direct current approximation, it is assumed that the currents I
+
i > 0 and
I−i > 0 are equal to the powers W
+
i and W
−
i generated by the supply nodes and consumed
by the demand nodes, respectively, as explained below. We assume that each supply node i
is connected to the source of voltage V +i by a line with high resistance R
+
i and each demand
node i is connected to the ground V −i by a line with high resistance R
−
i . For simplicity we
assume that V +i = V , where V is a constant, and V
−
i = 0.
Since the sum of all supply powers must be equal to the sum of all demand powers and
resistances R±i are much larger than Rjk of any transmission line, Vi ≈ V/2. Therefore
we can select R±i = V/(2W
±
i ) so that the current Ii flowing through each resistance R
±
i
is approximately equal to the power W±i . To ensure that R
±
i >> Rjk, we select V =
Mmaxi
(
W±i
)
maxjk (Rjk), where M is a large constant. If M increases, our approximation
of the power as current improves in terms of |Ii−W
±
i |, but the convergence of our algorithm
for solving the Kirchhoff equations slows down. We find for M ≈ 103, both accuracy and
speed are acceptable.
Thus, the system of the Kirchhoff equations for the grid consists of n linear equations for
the potentials of each node Vi
Vi

 ∑
j∈N(i)
1
Rij

− ∑
j∈N(i)
Vj
Rij
= δ+i I
+
i − δ
−
i I
−
i , (A1)
where δ+i = 1 or δ
−
i = 1 if a node i is a supply node or a demand node, respectively.
Otherwise, δ+i = δ
−
i = 0.
The determinant of this system is equal to zero, hence solving such a system requires
complex linear algebra procedures. In order to be able to use simple relaxation procedures,
we must regularize this system by adding positive diagonal terms. We can achieve this
by assuming that all the supply nodes are connected to high voltage V with resistance
R+i = M/I
+
i and that all the demand nodes are connected to the ground with resistance
R−i = M/I
−
i , where M is a constant. Since units of currents are arbitrary, we decrease I
+
i
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and I−i by a constant factor of one million; since M remains constant, this ensures that
R+i and R
−
i are much larger than any transmission line resistance Rij , so the potential
differences within the grid are much smaller than the potential differences between the grid
and the source, and between the grid and the ground. Thus, when considering the grid’s
relation to these external potentials, we can assume all the nodes have approximately the
same potential
Vg = V
1∑
i
1
R
−
i
1∑
i
1
R
+
i
+ 1∑
i
1
R
−
i
. (A2)
Since due to conservation of charge
M
∑
i
1
R−i
=
∑
i
I−i =
∑
i
I+i =M
∑
i
1
R+i
, (A3)
Vg = V/2. Furthermore, I
+
i R
+
i = M = I
−
i R
−
i equals the potential difference between the
demand nodes and the ground. Hence, M = Vg = V/2. Accordingly, Eq. (A1) can be
rewritten as
Vi

 ∑
j∈N(i)
1
Rij
+ δ+i
1
R+i
+ δ−i
1
R−i

− ∑
j∈N(i)
Vj
Rij
= δ+i
V
R+i
. (A4)
Now the determinant of this system is not equal to zero due to the presence of 1/R+i and
1/R−i terms in the diagonal elements of the system. System (A4) can be rewritten as
(I−B)~V = ~V0, (A5)
where I is an identity matrix,
bij =


0 for j /∈ N(i)
1
Rij
(∑
j∈N(i)
1
Rij
+δ+i
1
R
+
i
+δ−i
1
R
−
i
) for j ∈ N(i) , (A6)
and
( ~V0)i = δ
+
i
V +i
R+i
(∑
j∈N(i)
1
Rij
+ δ+i
1
R+i
+ δ−i
1
R−i
) . (A7)
Since the determinant | detB| < 1, Eq. (A5) can be solved iteratively:
~Vm+1 = B~Vm + ~V0 (A8)
with the initial condition Vi = V/2. Solving these equations, we find voltages (V )i of each
node and the current flow through each line Iij = |(Vi − Vj)/Rij |.
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Notes:
 To remove a line from the grid, we set its resistance Rij =∞ (i.e., set the conductance
to zero to prevent current from traveling through the line, thus the line has been
effectively removed).
 We assume that the tolerance of the lines connecting the supply nodes to V and
demand nodes to ground is α+ = α− = ∞, so these lines never fail. Such a model
with finite α+ is much more vulnerable to developing large blackouts than the most
conservative variant of shedding that we study.
Appendix B: Expediting Computation
To speed up the iterative algorithm for solving linear equations, we treat separately each
disconnected cluster. We pull from the main grid all the relevant information about each
cluster and treat them as grids of their own. We cut from these clusters the “dangling ends”,
defined (as in [14]) as areas of transmitting nodes connected to the rest of the cluster through
one single node. As these “dangling ends” have only transmitting nodes and only one point
of connection to the rest of the grid, they have zero current in all their lines. We identify
dangling ends by the Hopcroft-Tarjan algorithm for finding biconnected components [17].
We then solve the system in Eq. (A5) for each smaller cluster individually and incorporate
the data back into the main grid.
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